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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The main problem of this thesis concerns a dramatic shift in
American foreign policy vis-a-vis Moxico which took place in late
1923 and early 1924» Alvaro Obreeon assumed the office of President
of Mexico in December, 1920 during a most critical period in Mexican
history. Respite economic chaos t high unemployment and chronic
political instability which resulted from ten years of revolution,
the United States Government refused to recognize the ubreeon regime*
Recognition might have brought some semblance of order to Mexico as
this would have meant financial assistance from the United States
which was needed to repair and rebuild factories, mines and railroads*
However, Secretary of State Hughes declared on June 3, 1921 that
Obreffon would have to sicn a proposed Treaty of Amity and Commerce
which would settle for once and for all the problems facinc American
investors in Mexico which resulted from the Constitution of 1917 and
Carranza's decrees from 1915 to 1920.* It was directly implied by
Hughes that all of the benefits which would accrue from recognition
would only be forthcoming after the proposed treaty was signed. i?or
a number of reasons, including national priae and definitely estab-
lished precedents of international law, Obregon refused to submit to
•^For a sketch of the proposed treaty see United States Depart-
ment of 3 to Foreim Relations of the United States . 1921 lY^shin«rton f
1935), II, 397-404. nereafter cited as Forelf^n Relations.
such an agreement. Thus began a period of stalemate and animosity be-
tween the two governments which lasted for nearly three years as
Obregon's constitutionally elected government was deni 1^. recognition
"by the Harding Administration until the clauses in the Constitution of
1917 relating to oil and mines and Carranza's tax decrees had been
settled to our satisfaction*
The thaw in relations developed when the Bucareli Conference,
which was held in Mexico City, settled the outstanding questions be-
tween the two governments at least for a brief period of time* Recog-
nition was extended to the Obregon Government on Atigust 31, 1923 and
the text of the agreement was signed by both governments on September?.
There can be no doubt that recognition was obtained by Obregon because
of the proceedings at tho Bucareli Conference* One of the important
problems to be investigated is the reaction of the State Department,
the Administration, and the American press to this agreement which was
reached after a series of secret conferences* Was this simply a first
step taken by Hughes in an attempt to restore normal relations with
Mexico which would allow us to retreat from the inflexible position
that we had assumed in regard to the proposed treaty? Cur earlier
position had created some embarrassment for the Administration* This
was especially true in this country as most of the western states which
were usually antagonistic towards Mexico favored recognition. The true
test of what tho Bucareli agreement really meant to American officials
came shortly thereafter*
On December 6, 1923 a serious revolt led by Adolfo do la Huerta
broke out in Mexico, threatening to topple the Obregon regime. The
aCeolidge Administration had a crucial decision to make as the month of
December progressed because Hughes* a initial assessment of the situa-
tion proved incorrect. On January 7, 1924 Coolldge signed an embargo
proclamation which indicated tnat w© intendod to place our resources
at the disposal of Obregon while denying at the same time the oppor-
tunity for the de la Huorta faction to buy munitions in the United
States*
A number of questions immediately arise which must be answered
if this dramatic shift in policy is to be adequately explained. TOiy
did the United States decide to aid Obregon after refusing to recog-
nize him for nearly three years? Did we aid the Mexican Government in
its time of peril because of the agreement reached at the Bucareli
Conference? The factors which led Coolidge and Hughes to their de-
cision must be given close scrutiny, not only because it represented
a dramatic change in our previous policy in relation to Mexico, but
also because It emphasizes a problem which every foreign offico is
faoed with, namely how much weight should be attached to the reports
sent by their diplomatic representatives in that country.
Questions arise as well as to how our policy was implemented.
What kind of aid did we extend to the Obregon Government and how ef-
fective were United States agents in denying the Implements of war to
the rebels? Would victory have been possible for the Federal troops
without American assistance and did Hughos impose conditions on
Obregon in return for our aid? Even of greator importance, one must
examine tho thesis of Latin American historian Howard Ollne who in-
ferred that the United States government directly intervened in the
4struggle to Insure Obregon* s victory. Cline charged
t
Ho (Obregon) was savod from dofoat primarily by prompt aid
from tho Unltod States In the form of arms and actual
military cooperation* 1 Seventeon United States planes
bombed the do la Huorta revolutionaries in Jalisco for him. ^
This serious charge must be carefully examinod to see the United States
did directly intervene in the domestic affairs of our neighbor , to save
our choice from ultimate defeat. Finally, I intend to review the re-
action Ox the Amorlcan press and public which was instrumental in
forcing the Administration t© explain fully its decision to aid Obregon
to defend itself against its critics. Also, it must bo seen if domestic
oritics, especially In Congress, were ablo to have any moderating in-
fluence on tho Administration* s implementation of our policy*
finphasis must be placed on tho reasons for our decision to aid
Obregon. The United States decision in 1923 cannot be considered In &
vacuum but must bo compared with our earlier decisions in Latin America
when political instability erupted. TSas Cline correct in implying that
this wag a return to a form of "gunboat diplomacy** where American
troops were used to insure that American lives and property were pro-
tected? Is it possible that this decision marked a return to tfllson*s
basic philosophy, as expressed in his Mobile address, that democratic
governments should be fostered In Latin America oven if intervention
was required? Did Obregon receive our assistance because of his at-
tempts to bring about a more equitable distribution of wealth by intro-
ducing such measures as land reform? Thirdly, American aid might have
been extended to insure that a stable, orderly regime bo
allowed to
2Heward F. Cline, Th« United St*t„* and Mexico
(Cambridge, Mass.,
1953), p. 208.
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continue In power* Did this represent a more subtle use of our inter-
national police power" to maintain in power governments that had come
to terms with American officials? Instead of sending American units
into the field, had we now improved on Boosevelt f s "big* stick* by sup-
plying the legal government with munitions while denying the seme to
those who threatened the peace and stability of the country no matter
what the latter* s reasons were for starting the insurrection? In con-
elusion, it must be seen whether Hughes fully defined what his policy
encompassed* A series of general statements which were not specifically
explained could lead to misuse of Hughes* s policy in the future* Since
Hughes did depart somewhat from the oarlier American policy towards
Latin America (especially Harding's policy), tho burden rested with him
to make sure that his policy would not be distorted in the future be-
cause he failed to specifically define its limits and exceptions*
This topic is also of general concern today because it raised the
problem of our attitude towards the right of revolution* This question
presented a perplexing problem, especially since 1900, as the United
States had reached the position of a major world power in Latin America
who, of course, was interested in maintaining the status quo* On the
other hand, our past history brought about the espousal of numerous
theories which justified revolution not only to ourselves but to the
whole world. Every revolution, especially in our so-called "sphere ef
influence** of Latin America, started a debate between the idea that
revolution is Justified, unless it is financed by another snjwr world,
power, and the thesis that revolution is unjustified because it brings
in its .* political instability and economic chaos. If Itoited States
6officials fool that the revolution is not Justified. Mother right or
wrong, the question of intervention arises* Once the decision has been
made to intervene the question arises as to Tshich mode of action rm
will take* Should Intervention ho direct to insure a cpxlclc solution or
should It he indirect so It will ho possible to camouflage our Inten-
tions to maintain the image of non-intervention on our part? Those
perplexing problems of revolution and Intervention mast be kept in
mind if this problem is to be examined in the correct perspective*
CHAPTER II
BUGABELI CaWERMCE
From 1921 to 1923 tho Obregon Government made a long list of con-
cessions in accordance with scmo of tho terms of the proposed Treaty of
Amity and Commerce* However, despite the concessiens Obregon still re-
fused to sign the proposed treaty*3 By the beginning ef 1923 two
things still stood in the way of immediato recognition of the Mexican
Government by the United States. Huglios still wanted to have some ef
these basic guarantees in writing to incur© that the favorable condi-
tions given te the United States by the Obregon government would not
be repealed by his successor* If he could not persuade Obregon te sign
a treaty* he could perhaps obtain tho signature of the Mexican govern-
ment on some ether document which would effectively substitute for the
treaty and thus, bind future governments in Mexico te adhere te the
terms ef the agreement* Secondly, the United States believed that
numerous loopholes still remained which would only cause trouble in the
future if they weron*t solved now* V/e wanted to be positive about the
attitude ef the Mexican government on oil lands acquired after May 1,
1917 j the method of payment for American owned agricultural lands
which were expropriated; and the establishment of a commission to in-
SFor Obregon* s objections to signing the treaty see Foreign Rela-
tions . 1921 (Washington. 1935), II, p. 645. For a review of tho con-
cessions see Foreign Halations . 1923 ( Washington) , II, 526-32*
5veatigate the claims of our citizens against the l^xican government.
Thus, the last thing needed "before recognition would bece-e an accem-
plished fact was for the representatives ef both governments te sit
down and scire these last two problems.
Despite an earlier statement b7 Cbregon that he vrould net agree
te any meeting with the United States until his government was recog-
nized, he consented to a meeting of the personal representatives ef
each President which began on Hay 14, 1923." Charles 3. warren and
John Payne represented President Harding and Cbregon appointed P-amon
Bosas and Fernando Hoa as his personal representatives. Che original
purpose of the conference was to conclude a claims convention so
American citizens could receive compensation for lives lost and proper-
ty destroyed during the ten years of revolution in Hexico. This
claims convention would satisfy cr.e of the basic guarantees required by
the United States before it would extend recognition to Cbregon. Horo-
ever, Hughes insisted that he was unable to see any reason why assur-
ances should not be given as wo 11 in respect te the protection of other
fundamental interests. 5 ^» the scope of the convention broadened te
include other outstanding questions which existed between the two
governments. Hughes noted threo major problems which he instructed
TJarron to discuss with the Mexican commissioners. These were«
First. To the obtaining of satisfactory assurances against
confiscation of the subsoil interests in lands owned by
4Uhited States, Department of State P^cords of the D«rartment of
State P.glatir.r to the Internal Affairs cf Mexi co 1910-192? (V^shington,
1959), 812.00/25430, Yargas to Colby, February 17, 1921. Eereafter re-
ferred to as the Internal Affairs of h'oxico .
5A. H. Feller, The L'exican Claims Commission (How York, 1935), p. 22.
American citizens prior to May 1, 1917. Second. To the
restoration of proper reparation for the taking of lands
owned by American citizens. • • Third. To the making of
an appropriate claims convention. 6
The work of the Bucaroli Conference concluded on August 15, 1923
with the submission of the drafts of the Spocial and General Claims
Convention to Presidont Obregon and to President Coolidge.
The first problora concerned American owned proporty which was
acquired beforo the Constitution of 1917 went into effect on May 1,
1917. The United States demanded that oil lands be returned to their
rightful owners or that adequate compensation be made for those lands
7
which had been seized for failure to comply with Carranza's decrees.
In the case of agrarian lands which wore expropriated for reasons of
public utility, the United States insisted that payment be made in
each instead of "worthless bonds'* as proposed by Article 27 of the
Mexican Constitution of 1917. 8 Compensation should be paid on the
basis of the market value of the property. This was contrary to the
Mexican position, as outlined in the Constitution, that compensation
be based on its value assessed for tax purposes plus ton per cent.
On these two points the American commissioners won almost a complete (
victory. According to Article EC of the claims conventions, "...the
amount to be paid would be determined by deducting one governments
6Foreim Kolationa . 1923 (Washington, 1938), II, 543.
7For a complete picture of the most obnoxious decrees of Carranza
see Foroira Rolatlons . 1919 (Washington, 1934), p. 593 and Foreign
Belations . 1918 ( Y&shington, 1932), p. 737.
8The complete translation of the Constitution of 1917 can be
found ir Rolatlons . 1917 (Washington, 1930), pp. 951-79.
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total from the other's total and then payment would bo made in geld*"9
Of course, the Mexican Government could avoid payment by irrraediately
returning the land which had been expropriated. 10 This amounted to the
establishment of special privileges for American citizens in Mexico*
Their property would most likely be valued at a higher level by the conn
promise which was reached than would bo the case if the Mexican plan was
the basis of determining the value of the property* But of even greater
importance* Americans would receive cash payments instead of bonds in
return for their property. Ho other nationality group in Mexico, in-
cluding Mexicans, would receive cash for their property as they were
forced to accept the bonds as payment* This was contrary to the Calvo
clause which stated that aliens were not entitled to more than the
treatment which was accorded to nationals*11 This was an extremely high
price that Obregon had to pay for recognition and Article IX was sub-
jected to severe criticism when the terms of the conventions became
public knowledge*12
In the case of the oil lands, the United States received from the
Mexican commissioners a restatement of the decision that had been
reached in the Texas Oil Case which made the Mexican Supreme Court de-
cision more binding! This decision was not unfavorable to American oil
companies and inclusion of this decision in the conventions eliminated
Q
Feller, j>£* cit * , pp* 312-313*
10New York Times . August 16, 1923, p* 6*
11Feller, j>£» cit * , p* 185*
12Hew York Times , Decembor 21* 1923, p* 3*
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two of tho major American reservations about the case.13 Briefly, the
Mexican commissioners agreed that Article 27 would net have a retro-
active effect on land where some positive act had been performed prior
to May 1, 1917. If an American citizen had entered into a lease to
obtain the land or had started surveying or drilling the land prior to
May 1, 1917, this was considered to be sufficient evidence of his in-
tention to explore for oil and thus, this land was not subject to con-
fiscation. The Mexican commissioners insisted that land en which no
positive act had been performed prior fo May 1, 1917 would be retro-
actively affected and the rights to such land would revert to the
nation. . But they did agree that the former owners of such land would
be granted preferential rights to the oil in the subsoil to the exclu-
sion of any third party who had no title to the land«^ Oil lands
which fell into this category would have to comply with the provisions
of Article 27 and also with Carranza's decrees. Thus, if no positive
act had been initiated, ownership would be conditional in nature*
Since the Mexican Government owned the land, it was quite evident that
the nation could in tho future refuse to grant permission to drill on
its land and thus, these who held titles to such lands were really
concessionaires.
However, the United States commissioners did not agree with this
*3For a translation of the Texas Company case see Foreign Rela-
tions . 1921 (7*tshington, 1935), XX, 462-72. For a roviow of sorao of the
major American objections to the decision see the Now York Tlmog.
April 14, 1922, p. 10.
14
BenJamln H. Williams, Economic Foreign Policy of the Unltod
States (New York, 1929), p. 115.
th,
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recognition for the Obrogoi Gevernment. Hormal relations had boon re-
established between the two countries for th© first time since May 21,
1920. It ma remarkable that Obregon was able to remain in power from
December, 1920 until August, 1923 without the material and moral support
ef the United States and this is a testament to his ability and shrewd-
ness* Ohere was, however, a slight disagreement which preceded formal •
recognition of the Obregon Government by the United States. Xh« United
States wanted recognition and the signing of the two conventions to
occur almost simultaneously. 22 On the other hand, Obregon wantod recog-
nition to precede the signing of the Conventions by at loast a week and
also, he wanted recognition by August 31, 1923 so Obregon could announce
to the opening session of Congress on the next day that Jiiexic© had been
recognized "without having to enter into details that perhaps would be
best to omit for the time being."23 Obregon hoped that recognition
would occur before the text of the agreement was made public. It was
duo not only to the fact that Obregon feared that the extensive series
of concessions he had to make for recognition would become public know-
ledge too soon but also bocauso he did not want it to appear that the
General and Special Claims Convention were simply a substitute for the
Treaty of Amity and Commerce. It would be most unfortunato if a public
furor erupted before recognition was extended as it might undermine the
negotiations of the last few months. She request of Jtfexice was granted
as recognition was extended on August 31 and the conventions wore signed
22Foreign Relations , 1923 (Tfeshingten, 1938), II, p. 550.
23 Ibid., p. 552.
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•n September 7. 'jhia can be considered as a concession granted by
Hughes bat more realistically it must be considered as a slight techni-
cality of little importance at the time, hashes was unaware of the
frightful censequencos which would resalt from this technicality two
years later when Oalles was president.
What effect did the Conference have on the future relations be-
tween th<* two countries? Recognition of iiexico showed that Hughes, at
least, thought that all the troublesome questions of the past had been
satisfactorily settled. This was unrealistic as the United States
should never have expected this agreement to be binding on future
governments in Mexico which were not subjected te the pressures that
Obregon endured. V/hile the United States considered the conventions
to be as binding as a treaty which would be observed by all future
governments in Mexico, the Mexican government considered the Conference
to be a gentlemen's agreement which affected the Obregon government
only. 2 ** Contributing to the later Mexican contention that tho Con-
ference represented only an exchange of views which did not limit the
sovereignty of Mexico, was the fact that the conventions were signed
after recognition had been extended to the Obregon government. Eor
Obregon, the conference simply represented an exercise in political ex-
pediency which was necessary due to tho prevailing circumstances.
24Charles Evans Hughes, ihe Pathway of Peace (New ?ork, 1925),
p. 98.
25Anita Branner t ihe Wind That Swept Mexico (New York, 1943),
p. 66.
26Frflnlr lViTiTiftiibaum. Mexico: The Struffsle for Peace and Broad
(How rerk, 1950), p. 268.
_
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Special privileges were extended te Americans only -to gain recognition
and future governments in Mexico which did not operate under the handi-
cap of non-recognition would not have to honor obligations which had
been entered into under duress*
However, despite the long range effects of the conference which
tended to have an adverse offect on the relations between the two coun-
tries, it is more important to examine the initial reaction of the
American government, press and public to the Bucareli Conference at
least through the early part of 1924. 27 This is important b a con-
temporary .American opinion in regard to the conventions would play a
large role in determining what our policy would bo when Obregon was in
danger of being overthrown* If one examines the record, there can be
little doubt that American officials were ecstatic over the results of
the conference* In a letter to Sonater Lodge, Hughes stated: "The
arrangement contemplates full protection for all cases of oil- proper-
ties which were acquired after February (1917) and abandons in no re-
spect the attitude which the government has consistently maintained
with respect to property rights. 28 Even in retrospect, five years
later, when it had boon proved that the cenforonco did net settle every-
thing, Hughes argued i "Ihe adjustment of 1923 contained, it was be-
lieved (at least at the time), substantial assurances which wore roason-
27For a review of the trouble which developed later see Guy
Stevons, Current Controversies with Mexico (Now York, 1928), pp. 42-43.
28Uhited States, Congressional Record , 68th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1924, LX7, Part 2, 13277"
18
ably adequate*29 These sta&ements ware net issued "by a man whe had
accepted any kind ef agreement te silence his critics at heme whe favored
recognition. On the contrary, it is obvious that Hughes believed that
the United States had net compromised her position at all and that
Obregon*s reasonable attitude pins American pressure had resulted in a
most satisfactory agreement* President Coolidge agreed with this con-
clusion as he commended barren for a "fine piece of work, looking te
the guarantee ef peace and stabilization of economic and political re-
lations throughout the continent."3^
American newspapers, on the whole, agreed with this optimistic
assessment of the situation, 'ine Springfield Republican editorialized
that "Secretary Hughes had succeeded in oxacting positive diplomatic
assurances that Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution*... would not be
applied retroactively to the injury of American investors in Mexican
subsoil re source s.
W21 The Hew York Times gave most ef the credit for
the agreement to the Mexican executive as Obregon had the "points
cleared up* by subduing the rebellious minorities in Mexico who had
torpedoes other attempts in the past to bring about a reconciliation
between the two countries.32 Only a few discordant voices, like that
of the St. Paul Dispatch, were heard but their pessimistic view was
29Charles Evans Hughes, Our Relations te the Katlons of the
Western Hemisphere (Princeton, Wow Jersey, 1928), p» 43.
3
°Georgo Cyrus Thorpe, "The Mexican Problem Solved," North
American Review. September, 1924, p. 52.
31Sprlngfi «ld. Republican . September 1, 1923, p. 8.
32
"Making Up With Mexico," Literary Digest , September 8, 1923,
p. 15.
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Centrally Ignored by American peliey makers as Obregon tried te push
the conventions through the Mexican Congress as rapidly as possible.
In conclusion, ene cannot ©scape the fact that Americans generally
believed that nerraal relations had been restored on our terms and
that at last we had found in Mexico a reasonable man to deal with*
1CHAPTER III
CAUSES OF THE DE LA HUERTA REVOLT
The revolt would most likely have never occurred If thoro had not
boon a presidential olootion scheduled for the spring of 1924* Although
this is d- .ficult to prove, the history of Mexico bears witness to the
faot that it is very difficult to hold an election in a country whore
rebellion is considered the only way to gain power. As Tannenbaum ox-
plained i "Revolutions (in Mexico) tend to occur before elections be-
cause the only way of assuring that tho candidate will receive an of-
ficial majority is to control tho governmont."33 This was exactly
what happened in 1920, as the ©loction approached, when it became quite
obvious that Carranza intended to soo that his choice for tho presidency
would win instead of Obregon.34 23io rosult was a rebellion. Since
Artiolo 83 of tho Constitution of 1917 prohibits a Prosidont frem seek-
ing a socond consecutive torm, ho usually picks an "official candidate"
who is suro to win as tho government controls tho electoral machinery.
By tho fall of 1923 there wero two major candidates for the
presidency, both members of Obrogon^s cabinet. 'Jftey wero former Secre-
tary of tho Gobornacion (Internal Affairs) Plutarco Ellas Callos and
Secretary of Finance Adolfo do la Huerta. Although there was no sub-
33Tannenbaum, op. cit . , p. 92*
34Georg© B. Winton, Mexico t Past and Present (Hashville, Tenn.,
1928), p. 220.
20
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stantial proof for the charge, supporters of do la Haerta claimed that
not only ma Calles the official candidate which was true, hut alee
that Ubregen was coins to "impose" Calles on the country by insuring
his victory whatever the cost.35 33ie only historian, Omening, who has
studied the causes of the revolution in detail concluded! "He evidence
exists that previous to the de la Haorta revolt, ho (Obregon) had
lifted a finger to •impose' Calles. . .
.
n36 With two strong candidates '
in the field a cleavage developed in ©very realm of Mexican society as
supporters of the Cbrogen Government hacked Calles while groups or
factions who felt thoy had boon mistreated by Obregon took up the cry
ef "imposition" and supported de la Huerta. The latter included labor
unions known as the C G« T. (Confederacien General de Trabajadoros)
and the Hallway Unien, the conservative wing ef the army, and the land-
owners, known as the hacondades, to name just a few of the more important
groups. In each case the above mentioned groups boliovod th?*: the
government's reform program, which would most likely be continued by
Calles, was harmful to them or thoy wore disastisfied because government
favor was boing bestowed on their enemies. With the unions, they were
unhappy because Obregon cultivated the friendship of the rival C. H. O. IS.
(Cenfederacien flegional Obrere Mexicana) with government funds which
37 *
subsidized its activities. With the generals, if Obregon' s famous
"silver oannonballs" or bribes were unable to end the opposition ef the
35Brenner, _op_. cit . , p. 72.
36Ernest Gruening, Mexico and Its Horltage (Hew York, 1928), p.658.
S?
: P» 357.
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conservative wing of the army (Obregen was the leader of the liberal
wing), the generals would be transferred to a new area which was quite
a distance from their "basic area of influenoe and power. 38 Finally,
Obregon»s land reform program alienated the hacendades because he
showed he would enforce the program for the first time since the agrar-
ian decree of January, 1918 by establishing the principle that ne
longer was there "any question of the right of villages to land; the
problem was rather how to make the right effective.
"
s9 Thus, these
groups, and others as well, joined the ranks of the revolutionaries #
The only way they could gain the favor and protection of the government
was to install their ewn man in power. Principles were of little im-
portance as this was a struggle of the "outs" to gain power and if they
were successful they would be amply rewarded.
Another factor which can not be ignored in considering the causes
ef the revolt was the insidious "cult of personalisra" which existed in
Mexico.48 JSaoh leader of a factien, despite its size, had as his main
goal the furthering of his own political ambitions. If do la Huerta,
a strong candidate, had not decided to break his oath not to run for
the presidency a revolt might have boon avoided.
41 Thrust into the
spotlight by the Lamont-de la Huerta agreement, he became the object of
attention for those who hoped to further their own ambitions by playing
38Cline, 0£. olt. . pp. 196-97.
39Eyler IT. Simpson, iho E.Udot Mexico's \7a.v Out (Chapel Hill,
No. Car., 1937), pp. 02-03.
40InternaI Affairs of Mexico . 812.00/26275, Summerlin to Hughes
Bulnes editorial , i&rch 19, 1923.
41 Ibid . . 812.00/26457, Summerlin to Hughos, September 15, 1923
and 812.00/26467, Summerlin to Hughes, September 28, 1923.
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en Ma vanity.42 »hen ho did become a candidate, a complete breakdown
in governmental operations occurred as the only issue of importance be-
came the presidential election. In the legislative branch the actions
of the Callistas and the Euertistas were calculated to arouse emotions
which prevented any rational solution of the issue. Charges flew in
both directions until the inevitable occurred when violence broke out
43in the National Congress. Eventually the whole country became a
battlefield. In passing, however, it should bo noted that since per-
sonalities played such a large role in Mexican politics, it appeared
that do la Huorta would use any issue, such as the cry of imposition,
to further his ambitions. Thus, the revolutionaries again appeared to
be devoid of any reasons which were serious enough to justify a rebel-
lion*
The incident which brought everything into the open, namely, the
resignation of do la Huerta from the Cabinet and the announcement of
his candidacy, was the election held in the state of Jian Luis Potesl
en August 5, 1923. The contest for Governor of the citato involved Mr*
Priete Laurens, a close friend ef do la wuerta, and Aurelia Manriquo,
a backer ef Oalles. This was the first test of strength between both
forces and was a preview of the upcoming presidential election. Laurens
was declared the winner of tho election which was described as "little
mere than a farce."44 result, of course, was that Manrique took up
42
For details of the agreement see George Creel, The People floxt
Door (New York, 1926), pp. 361-62.
43 Intornal Affairs of Mexico . 812.00/26483, Suraraerlin to Hughes,
Ootober 19, 1923.
44 Ibid . . 812.00/2167, Suramerlin to Hughes, September 28, 1923.
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arras in the hopes ef reversing what he considered to be a fradulent
election. A civil war had begun in the state between two evenly
matched forces. Obregon decided to intervene in the struggle on Sep-
tember 22, 1923 by using his power as expressed in Article 76 of the
Constitution. Article 76 provided the JBxecutive with the powert "To
declare, when all the constitutional powers of any state have disap-
peared, + at the occasion has arisen to give to the said State a pro-
visional governor. The appointment of such a governor shall be made
by the Senate. w When the Senate refusod to unseat Laurens, the op-
position charged that Obregon had violated state sovereignty because
he interfered for the sole purpose of insuring the victory of a Oalles
supportor»4e ilio pretext for revolution had boon established as tho
cry of imposition, the only major issue prior to and during the revolt,
was raised. Henceforth, the situation quickly deteriorated.
General Jj'iguero, a supporter ef de la Huerta, was tho first to
use force against an agent of the Federal Government as he deposed
Governor Heri in Guerrero on December 2, 1923. £ho defections in tho
array had bogun. Do la Huerta slipped out of the capital on December
fourth and arrived in Veracruz tho following day, after a meeting with
General Sanchez and othor military loaders, ho informed Obregon that
47
his government would no longer be recognized.
45Ferei«i filiations . 1917 (Washington, 1930), p. 966.
46 Internal Affairs of Mexico . 812.00/26467, Summorlin to Hughes,
September 28, 1923.
47 Ibid . . 812.00/26648, Consul Wood to Hughes, December 13, 1923.
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De la Aorta's revolutionary program was interesting and should
be examined here* His manifesto issued on December 9, 1923 statedt
First — •••absolute respect for the lives and liberty of the
people and for the property of Nationals as well as foreigners*
Second — Immediate reflation of Article 123* ••
(third Justice must govern for all ov/ners of small pieces of
land who are really cultivating it, and also for the holders
of large strips of lands* ••
Seventh --Intensification of public instruction by practical
education*
The program was exceedingly vague and contained nothing: new* If de la
Huerta believed that this manifesto would justify his revolt to American
officials, he was sadly mistaken* For instance. Excelsior , a Mexican
newspaper which had opposed most of Obregcn f s programs, strongly con-
demned the rebellion and pleaded for general loyalty to the Government*41
Since both sides were evenly matched, the reaction of the United State!
te these developments would be vital In determining the eutceme*
48Kew York Times . December 10 f 1923, p* 4*
49 Internal Affairs of Mexico . 812*00/26612* Summerlin to Hughes,
Deoember 7, 1923*
CHAPTER 17
FORMULATION OP AMERICAN POLICY
United States policy must actually be divided into three stages.
The first aection will deal with American policy from September, 1923
until the outbreak of the revolution on December 5. Of special im-
portance in this section, will ho a consideration of the reports of
our diplomatic representatives in Mexico* it is important to note
what side our representatives favored as it was only natural for them
to he affected by the propaganda of either the Huertistas er Callistas.
Lastly, it must be seen whether the United States government took any
steps to offer a compromise solution to both sides to try and find a
peaceful solution* If this was not done, did the State department
make any plans as to what the United States position would be when the
revolt did break out? The second section will deal with a study of
our initial polioy after the revolt hroke out. A close examination
must be made of the reasons why Coolidge and Hughes decided to change
from a passive policy of watchful waiting to a policy of indirect in-
tervention in the struggle.
JSren a cursory examination of reports from our diplomatic repre-
sentatives in Mexico prior to December, 1923 indicated that a violent
upheaval would occur at any time. As early as March 9, 1923 Charge
d»Affaire Summerlin observed that a definite 'risk of civil war" existed
because of the upcoming Presidential campaign*
50 He was more explicit
50 Ibid
., 812.00/26254, Summerlin to Wughes, March 9, 1923.
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after do la tfuerta resigned as he statedt "!Ehe danger to the estab-
11 shod order in a contest between two fairly evenly matched factions
(Huertistas and Callistas) is not to be overlooked.**51 Even if of-
ficials in Washington wore unaware of the past history of Mexico when
an eleotlon approached or discounted tho earlier warnings of our
representatives, they could not have ignored the reports of our diplo-
mats in October and November, 1923 which clearly showed an increasing
pattern of violence and an apparent desire by both sides te resolve the
matter by using force. For instance, besides describing clashes be-
tween both factions in the streets, Suraraerlin concluded his report of
November 1, 1923 by stating that "virtual war" existed in the Chamber
of Deputies ag deputies of both sides were wearing bullet proof vests.**2
After further incidents in the first week of November there was almost
no doubt in Summerlin*s mind that it was only a matter of time befero
the revolt would break out. In his dispatch to the department on
November 16 he conoludedt "The possibility of an armed conflict aris-
ing out of the presidential contest is being taken more and more into
the calculations of Interested observers and of the public at large...
Thus, the dispatches sent by our diplomats in Mexico accurately reported
the domestic crisis which had ovolved and officials at the State .Depart-
ment should have been cognizant of the fact that a revolt would break
out and devised their policies accordingly.
51 lb id*. 812.00/26467, Summerlin to Hughes, September 29, 1923.
52Ibid . . 812.00/26498, Summerlin to Hughes, November 11, 1923.
^Ibid. . 812.00/26513, Summerlin te Hughes, November 16, 1923.
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Besides describing the rapidly moving events in Mexico, the dip-
lomatic representatives ef the United States alse divulged their inner-
mest prejudices. Realizing that United States policy, especially in
regard to the revolt, would be determined at the highest levels in
lflashington, our charge'', and consuls in Mexico were not afraid to sug-
gest the possible outlines our policy should take. In nearly every
case, eui. diplomats suggested that it v/ould be in the best interests
ef the United States if do la Huerta won. For instance, Sumraerlin who
essentially tried to remain neutral, commented! "In campaign manifes-
toes the Calles party regularly takes a radical and Revolutionary'
stand while the do la Huerta followers have been rather boldly con-
servative."^ However, much stronger opinions were expressed. Consul
Lee R« Blohm was much more emphatic as he statedt "It is therefore a
question in the mind ef the writer whether the suppression of this
revolution, if it means the rise to power of the 'agraristas* along
with Calles, is fer the best interest of Mexico."
55 The most outspoken
proponent ef do la Huerta was Consul John F. 7/ood who was stationed at
Veracruz where the revolt began. In his initial dealings with the
rebels he observed that do la Huerta* s officials wore "telling only the
truth" which was '*un-Mexican. . . and more in keeping with our own way."
5
Two weeks later V/ood directly inferred, that de la Huorta»s movement,
54 Ibid . . 812.00/26483, Sumraerlin to Hughes, October 19, 1923.
55
Ibid . . Consul Blohm to the Secretary of State, December 29,
1923*
56 Ibid . . 812.00/26648, Uonsul Wood to tho Secretary of State,
December 7, 1923.
29
which "will be recognized as a boon to Mexico and all foreign interests,"
would bo successful in ten days if he had the necessary arms and am-
munition from the United States. 57 Numerous other reports could bo
cited to demonstrate that the consuls thought that the Callista faction
was a threat to the best interests of the united States but this simply
58
would bo repetitious. In direct contrast to this, I was unable to
find one instance of an American Consul who believed that a victory by
Callos and his eventual election would be of benefit to the United
3tates. If Hughes acted on these reports alone, there is little doubt
that the Unitod States would have either remained neutral in the strug-
gle or have actively aided the Huertistas.
The immediate response of the State Department to the events
leading up to and including the outbreak of the revolt was one of in-
action. There is no evidence of Hughes or Ceolidge formulating any new
policy prior to tho revolt. On© must assume that thoy either did not
believe the reports of our diplomats in Mexico that a revolt would
break out or that thoy believed it would only be a minor domestic squab-
ble which the United States need play no part in. No attempt was mado
v
by the United States government in the period prior to the revolt to
offer the good servicos of our Charge in an attempt to bring both fac-
tions to the conference table to work out a compromise. This was por-
57
Ibid . . 812.113/9376, Consul Wood to tho Secretary of State,
December 21, 1923*
^Por instance see Ibid.. 81200/26504, Consul \feltor Boyle to tho
Secretary of State, November 13, 1923 and 812. 00/24873, Consul Gaylord
Marsh to the Secretary of State, February 23, 1921.
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haps due to the unfortunate results which occurred in 1912 when Ambas-
sador Henry Lane Vllson tried to negotiate a settlement prior to the
overthrew of Madero. \7hen news of the revolt reached Ykshingten the
State Department did not issue any official announcement as to its in-
tent. As a matter of fact, the United States Government didn f t even
acknowledge publicly that they were cognizant of the situation in Mexico
until late in December.
It would be simple enough to conclude that the united States was
ignorant of events in Mexico and thus, our response was due to a frantic
search for a policy which would be suitable in this situation* However,
as was already mentioned, the State Department was not unaware of the
trend of events in Mexioo as our representatives had clearly pointed out
that a revolt was imminent* At the beginning, Hughes hoped that the
trouble was only local and that the revolt would be contained in Vera-
59
cruz and kept from spreading to the rest of Mexico* V&shington bt-
lieved that Obregon would be able to weather the storm and that it would
be premature on our part to intervene in a struggle which would be
quickly concluded* Even as late as December 19 the Administration was
confident ef this as the Ndw York limes reported that Coolidge f s cabinet
didn*t discuss Mexico at the meeting on December 18 and "this was cited
as evidence of the faith of officials here that the present Mexican
Government will retain its power."60 In addition, since Hughes was
5%ew York Times * December 16, 1923, Sec. X, p. 3.
60New York 'rimes . December 19, 1923, p. 3.
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cenfidtnt of a quick Obregen victory, he wanted te make sure that the
United States took no action which could possibly involve us in the
struggle or embarrass Cbregon. For instance, when the United States
Consul at Manzanilla requested en December 15, 1923 a destroyer to
protect American lives and property in the face of impending disorder,
he received this reply. Hughes informed the Consul "that the Depart-
ment is reluotant to have a war vessel call at Manzanilla unless and
until absolutely necessary.,."61 One can argue that Hughes did this te
avoid the revival of the old days of "gunboat diplomacy" but this con-
clusion seems unlikely when it is compared with United States actions
the following month.
Thus, the State Department had followed a policy of watchful
waiting from December 5 to December 23, 1923. The United States was
neutral in this period as there seemed no need for action on our part
as long as it appeared that the revolt was localized and Ubregon was to
be the victor, The State Department instructed our diplomats in Mexico
that dealings with the rebels "should be strictly informal and unoffi-
cial."62 Thus, although the United States was net going to recognize
their belligerency, contacts with the rebels, even though informal,
were kept open, hven of greater importance was the fact that Hughes
did net countermand food's Instruction to American steamship agents en
61 Internal Affairs of Mexico . 812.00/26603, Hughes te the Consul
at Manzanilla, December 15, 1923.
62United States, Department of State, Records ef the Department
of State Relating to Political delations Between the United States and
llexlco 1910-1929 ( YJashington, 1960), 711.12/515a, Hughes to Consul
Wood, December 15, 1923.
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December 6 at Veracruz that they could safely pay thelr roBttIB8 dutleg
te the rebels and that they could load and unload shipments at the
port, notwithstanding an order by Obregon to the eontrary. 63 At this
time nothing was mentioned about paying the duties under protest as
would be done with an illegal government. After December 23, the
State Department would not agree to any action by one of its agents
(Wood or any ether consul) which was contrary to an executive order
issued by Obregon. in relation to arms requests by the rebels, Hughes
simply told do la Huerta on December 21 that it would not be advisable
to answer to answer his request at this time. 64 This reply did not
eliminate the chance that the rebels would be able to ehtain arms from
the United States Government in the future. However, a request by the
Obregon Government on December 15 for the sale of two discarded American
naval cruisers was refused because of the provisions of Article 18 of
the lreaty of the Limitation of Eaval Armaments signed at V&shington. 65
After this reply, the Obregon government must have been somewhat sus-
picious of our intentions as Obregon told his Foreign Office to be
alert to protest against any American assistance or participation in
the rebel movement." In conclusion, It ^as Impossible to forecast
with any accuracy what the American government would do if Hughes's
Internal Affairs of Mexico . 812.00/26533, Consul i/ood to the
Secretary of State, December 6, 1923.
64lbid . . 812.00/26647, nughes to Consul food, i>ecember 21, 1923.
65
For complete details ef the treaty see gorgign Halations . 1923
(Washington, 1938), II, 567-68.
6 6 lnternal Affairs of Mexiee . 812.00/26727, afuramorlia to Hughes,
December 22, 1923.
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"basic supposition that Obregon would win a quick victory proved in-
oorreot. If ovents changed the State Department would have to reap-
praise its position of watchful waiting.
Daring the first three weeks of the revolt events transpired
which brought a change in the American position. First of all, Hughes's
supposition about the revolt proved completely unfounded as the month
•f December progressed. The revolt which began in Veracruz quickly
spread to other parts of the country bocause an increasing number of
generals in the army defected. On December 7, 1923, there were already
67feur other states in revolt. Array units joined the rebels in full
battle array. Most ef the strategic Mexican Gulf perts fell into the
hands of the rebels when the Gulf fleet deserted* 68 Although the
Government managed to retain the Pacific ports throughout the rebellion,
the ports needed for importing arras had fallen. Another serious blew
was inflicted when the two major oil producing areas, Tuxpam and Tam-
eq
pico, were captured by the rebels. The Government's chief source of
revenue had been cut off and it would be very difficult indeed to take
care of normal governmental obligations, such as paying the army and
the foreign debt. The Federal troops had accomplished little, at least
not enough to offset the debilitating losses. JJy Christmas Day,
Cuemavaca, only forty miles from Mexico City, had fallen in a rebel
67Now York Times . December 7, 1923, p. 5.
68Intemal Affairs of Mexico . 812.00/26727, Summerlin to Hughes,
December 22, 1923.
69Naw York Time s . December 30, 1923, p. 15.
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offensive. By the end of Decombor Obrogon was in serious trouble as
ho controlled only the inwediato area around Mexico City and the barron
north. Calculations by our Consul in Veracruz, Jehn Wood, showed that
the rebols controlled ten states and the (iovornment eight, while the
rebels held sevonteen ports and the Government had only ten.
71
Thus,
by the end of December not only was the revolt not localized but there
wan a distinct threat that the rebellion might become a long drawn out
s truckle* Moreover, Obreeon was in serious dancer of beinff overthrown
a s the now year dawned*
Another significant factor was the advers* effect that the revo-
lution had on American businessmen operating in Mexico* Revolution
brought in its wako disorder and chaos which upset transportation
scheduler and production timetables* Kebol movements had cut off sup-
plies to Mexico City and some factories were forced to close down their
operations because of the lack of raw materials* 'iliis was especially
true in the case of the weaving mills. 7^ In addition, when rebel
forces occupied the oil fields a drastic reduction in oil production
ensued*
The State Department was not likely to overlook protests such as
those made by the Narragansett and *Jew England Power Fuel Companies
which were critically short of the oil necessary to produce licht and
7QNow York Times . .December 24 f 1923. p. !•
71 Internal Affairs of Moxico . Consul "food to the Secretary of
State, January 4, 1924.
7 2
ITew York Times . January 6 f 1923, p* 3*
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power in Hhode Island. 73 *<ven the attitude of H. IT. Branch of the
Huasteca Petroleum Company changed from one of open opposition te the
Obregon' Government to a belief that Obregon should be aided by the
United States if it was necessary to insure stability. 74 Hughes com-
mented that the United States needed the exportation of oil from Tam-
75pioo unhampered. The Hew York Times stated earlier in the month
that "so long as the Mexicans keep the row to themselves and do not
interfere with the persons or properties of American citizens, the
government will, according to reliable reports, maintain the attitude
of a neutral observer. However, since rebel activities wore re-
sponsible for the disruption of business activities, this would negate
to a great extent the favorable reports of our diplomatic representa-
tives in Mexico with respect to do la Huerta and his followers.
Another event in December which changed the situation was due te
a shrewd move by Ubregon. American diplomats in Mexico not only re-
ported their favorable impressions of de la rtuerta but they particularly
emphasized their opinions that it would be sheer madness on our part to
support Ubregon when it would mean the eventual election of the radical
Calles as his successor.
Obregon took steps in iiecember to blunt the impact of this argu-
ment. The Mexican Government stopped supporting Calles and instead
73 Internal Affairs of Lkxico . 812.00/26795, Chase to Colt,
January 18, 1924.
74Ibld .
. 812.00/26852, Sylie te Hanna, January 14, 1924.
75Ibid . . 812.00/26767, Hughes to Summerlin, January 15, 1924.
76Rew York Times. December 16, 1923, Sec. V., p. 3.
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I.
oalled for loyalty to the government.77 Ualles discreetly was forcod
Into the background as he was not given a military command until more
than two weeks after the revolt broke out despite the fact that ho
applied for a battlefield commission when the revolt broke out. 'ilhe
revolt now was not against the imposition of a radical, as character-
ized by our diplomats and the rebels, but it was an attempt to remove
a duly elected, constitutional government headed by Obrego'n. Seen in
this light it would be difficult for the State Department to refuse to
aid an individual who had agreed to some important concessions at the
Bucareli Conference. Moreover, Ualles tried to prove that the charges
levelled against him by our American consuls were false. In speeches
made by Ualles in this period, one is impressed by their moderate tone
which is in stark contrast to his earlier statements. Hot only did he
appeal to the middle class for support but he promised "strict com-
pliance with all contractual obligations" and the observance of "method
78
and order" in the land reform program. Also, he stated numerous
times that he would follow Cbregon's policies. He did this not only to
attract the votes of Cbregon's admirers but also to dispel the belief
that he wag a radical, in an obvious reference to the Bucareli Con-
ference, Calles stated that he would "comply vigorously with the legal
agreements which they (the Mexican Government) contract with other
77Internal Affairs of Mexico. 812.00/26727, Sumraerlin to Hughes,
December 22, 1923.
78P"hit.aroo Elias Calles. Moxioo Bofore the T7orld. Trans, by
R. H. Murray (New York, 1927), pp. 4-10.
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nations. «™ This tended to eliminate any deubt which may have arisen
about Callers attitude toward tho Huoareli agreement which was favor-
able te the United States, fiie Gevemment then had discounted the
claim that the revolt was justified because it was aimed at removing a
radical threat to the country. Olhis made the rebellion appear to have
no basic motive for its existence. In conclusion, this change in
Calles's behavior was responsible to a great degree for Hughes's de-
cision to ignore the recommendations of our diplomatic corps in Mexico.
Another significant factor, which created serious concern in
V&shington circles and which led to the Araerioan decision to change its
policy, was the apparent split developing in the rebel ranks. Ohere
were already indications in December that the rebels were splitting
into disgruntled factions. Jf'or instance, when General Aiaycetto re-
volted in Caxaca he denounced the titular head of the rebellion, de la
Huerta, and expressed his desire to establish a military triumvirate te
lead the revolt. 8^ Because of the character of the revolt, it was
quite likely that the ambitious men who were its leaders would continue
the struggle if Gbrege'n was deposed. A letter from U. B. Graves in-
dicated that this development was likely as he warned the State Depart-
ment thuslyi "If the revolt should succeed, disorder will prevail for
a long time as a harmonious grouping of the successful ones Is about as
on
difficult as a campaign. w would mean mounting instability which
79 Ibld *. p. 12.
8 0lntemal Affairs of Mexico . 812.00/26727, Summerlin to Hughes,
December 22, 1923.
81 Ibid .. 812.00/26720, Lodge to Hughes, January 4, 1923»
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would probably last for a number of years and American live* and proper-
8?ty would be endangered*
Other events occurred in Mexico which had a great deal to do with
the American decision to intervene in the struggle on the side of the
Obregon Government. Of utmost importance here was the fate of the
General and Special Claims Convention signed at the Bucaroli Conference.
Heoognition of Obregon was based on this but the agreement had to be
ratified by the Mexican Senate. Y&en Obregon presented both conventions
to the Senate in December for their consideration, the State Department
must have been alarmed by the reception they received, especially from
tho de la Ifuerta faction in the Senate. On December 20, 1923 tho
Huortistaa were very vociferous in their criticism of Article IX of tho
Claims Conventions which allowed Americans to be paid in cash instead
•f in bonds for their land which was confiscated for reasons of public
utility. 'ikus it is possible that, despite tho favorable pronounce-
ments of de la Huerta, which made such an impression on men such as
Consul Wood, the State Department believod ho (de la Huerta) was behind
some sinister plot to destroy tho guarantees we received at the Bucaroli
Conference. Moreover, de la Huerta whose revolt was inadequately fi-
nanced began the practice, obnoxious in American eyes, of requiring
that American firms in Mexico advance money to his movement face tho
®^A lesson from the past taught that it was more than a distinct
possibility that if the revolt succeeded further difficulties could be
oxpoctod. After Huerta was deposed in 1914 by the triumvirate of Car-
ranza, Villa and Zapata, the real pov/er struggle began.
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ITow York Times. December 21, 1923, p. 3.
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threat of reprisal. 84 Another adverse feature of the revolt in the eyes
of the State Department was that the return of the railreads (taken over
by the government during the Revolution from 1911 to 1920) to private
interests was postponed by Obregon in December, 1923 until the rebels
should bo crushed.85 Thus, do la Huerta appeared to be upsetting some
of the delicate negotiations which had been carried out by tho two
governments from 1921 to 1923. inuring the same period, Obregon was
making a favorable impression on American officials with his attempts to
carry through tho various agreements with the United States despite the
turbulence created by the rebellion. The Hew Yerk Times commented j
...although it (Mexican Government) is at present called upon
to cope with insurgents, it has approved one of the claims con-
ventions recently negotiated and has asserted its determination
promptly to approvo the other; and by the further fact that,
during the past few days, at a time when unusual demands are
being made on its revenues, it has completed a substantial de-
posit to carry out its agreement for refunding the Mexican debt.
Tho statements by our consuls in Mexico that our national interests
would be served by supporting tho rebellion did not appear to be justi-
fied by events during tho month of December*
There were definite signs near the end of 1928 which Indicated
that the Departments attitude had shifted away frem the earlier policy
of watchful waiting. Hughes instructed our consuls at Veracruz and
Manzanilla, two of the rebel strongholds, to "discreetly investigate
and telegraph the Department if any shipments of war materials are
^Internal Affairs of Mexico. 812.00/26664, Summerlin to Hughos,
December 24, 1923*
85Ibio>, 812.00/27123, Summerlin to Hughes, Aiarch 8, 1924*
8 6lT«w Yerk Times. January 1, 1924, p. !•
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received "by the rebel forces. A similar study was net made ef the
Government's source ef supplies. This appeared te be a preliminary
step which could lead to further action if it was discovered that the
rebels were obtaining arms from the United States. Although no embargo
had been placed on the shipment of arms, the State Department by the
third week of December had prohibited the exportation of government
equipment into Mexioe. Although private shipments of arms to the
rebels were not prohibited, the Mexican newspaper Excelsior considered
this to be an indication that Hughes thought the rebel movement wag
"illegal". 88 The real test would come, however, when both sides in tho
struggle would issue a request for tho purchase of weapons and ammuni-
tion from either the government or private sources in tho United States.
On Deoember 26, 1923 the Ubregon Government through its representative
in Vfeshingten, 'i'ellez, made a request for arras. He wanted to know if
tho United States Government was willing to sell a number of rifles
89
that were in 3an Antonio, Texas. Threo days later, in a secret con-
ference, Hughes gave i'ellez an affirmative reply to the request. A de-
cisive factor which brought about this decision was an urgent dispatch
from Summerlin a few days before that stated "unless wo take some kind
90
ef moral intervention" matters will become worse*
8 7 Internal Affairs of l.lexlco . 812.00/26618a, Hughes to Consul Wood,
Deoomber 15, 1923, and 012.00/26S19a, Hughes to the Consul at iaanzanilla,
December 17, 1923.
8 8 Ibid »
.
812.00/26698, Summerlin to Hughes, December 22, 1923.
8 9Forel^n Relations . 1923 (Washington, 1938), II, 568.
90 Internal Affairs of Mexico . 812.00/26673^, Hanna to Hughes,
Summerlin Dispatch, December 23, 1923
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The decision to soli arms to the uoxioan Government did not re-
main a secret for long as a leak occurred in the State Department or,
even more likely, in the 57ar Department. On January 4 f 1924 Senator
Fairchlld demanded a full inquiry into the report that arms were
secretly being sold to the government in Mexico and he also wanted the
State Department to provide all the details of the sale. 91 The State,
Department was being pressured into publioly admitting its decision.
It would also have to provide reasons to justify its position as the
decision would arouse opposition in Congress. Any further attempt to
delay a public announcement was dismissed as de la Huerta decided to
test his rights by ordering 5,000 rifles, 3,000,000 rifle ridgea
and 100,000 round3 of machine gun ammunition. 92 In de la li.
attempt ) clear the air of any doubts, he brought the full weight of
the United States Government to bear against his movement. On Janu-
ary 7, 1924 President Uoolidge announced the decision that would vital-
ly affect the struggle In Mexico. Utilizing the authority he was granted
under the provisions of a congressional act of January 31, 1922, which
superseded the proclamation of 1912, Coolidge placed an embargo on the
exportation of arms or munitions into Mexico. Shipments of arms or
munitions were permitted, with the approval of the State Department, if
they were going to the Obrogon Government or if they were needed for
94.
industrial purposes. 50xis,arm8 could be sent to the Mexican Govorn-
9 1!Tow York Times . January 4, 1923, p. 3.
92
^Tew *ork Times . Jamxary 6, 1924, p. 1
937/illiams, _op_. alt . , p. 148.
^'orqiffi Relations . 1924 ('.ihshington, 1939), II, p. 429.
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ment (except for ships) but any attempt to smuggle arms to the rebels
would result in confiscation of the weapons, fines and imprisonment.
According to Hughes, we were*
...throwing our influence in an entirely correct manner in favor
of the development of constitutional government and against un-
warrantable uprisings, in protecting the legitimate freedom of
commerce, we are making the greatest contribution directly within
our power, and in accord with our established traditions and
manifest interest, to the cause of world peace. 95
Despite such official pronouncements, it is important to note now what
our main reasons were for intervening in the struggle in xdexioe.
First of all, the Administration had to show critics that its
decision to sell arms to Obrego'n did not establish a shattering prece-
dent and that it was legal in terms of international law. teighes argued
that this action did not constitute Intervention per se but represented
what he termed to be "non-belligerent interposition."96 Since there
were no recognized belligerents in an insurgency according to inter-
national law, the shipments would not conflict with any neutrality laws.
Interposition, a device discredited during our own Civil Y&r, was being
used by Hughes to aid a friendly government which was involved in a
domestic disturbance. In explaining his interpretation of American
foreign policy, Hughes stated* "In granting the request (for arms),
there was no question of intervention, no invasion of the sovereignty
•f Uexioo, as we were acting at its insistence and were exercising our
95Hughes, The Pathway of Peace (Hew York, 1925), p. 101.
96Charles Evans Hughes, Our Relations to the Hat ions of the
Vfe stern Hemisphere (Princeton, ilew Jersey, 1928), pp. 81-82. *'or an «
analysis of interposition see Dexter Perkins, Charles Evans Hughes
and American Democratic Statesmanship (Boston, 1956), pp. 135-36.
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undoubted right to sell arms to the existing government •*97 (Thus,
Hughes contended that even though we had the rieht to intervene directly
in the struggle since there was n© recognized "belligerent, the United
States was simply interposing its will. In ether words, direct inter-
vention, as practiced during the years ef "gunboat diplomacy", was "being
cast aside for the more sophisticated method of interposition. As Sec-
retary ef TCar Weeks pointed out, sales such as this had ocourred before.
For example, Washington had sold 5100,000 of arms to Cuba and #170,000
98
to Nicaragua in 1919. However, he failed to mention that no elaborate
policy of interposition was then drawn up to defend this action because
there were no critics of the sales. Hughes saw another precedent for
this sale which was established just shortly after World ?&r I when we
99
sold arms to six .European governments. Again there was a difference
in this case which was not mentioned as civil 3trife was not occurring
in these countries as was the case here in Mexico in 1923 and 1924.
The Administration defended its decision by proving that no
international agreement which the United States was a party to had been
broken. For instance, Harding had not signed the Convention of 3t»
Germain which would have prevented the shipments. 100 The United States
was not a member ef any pact which restricted our course of action in
97Hughes, The Pathway of Peace (New York, 1935), p. 100.
98
"A Sleight of Hand Deal in Mexico," Current Opinion . February,
1924, p. 144.
"United States, Congressional Kecord , 68th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1924, LXV, Part 2, 1407.
l°Ofileanor Kyllys Allen, "The Case for American Aid to ubregon,"
Current history leasing (N.w York Time si , April, 1934. pp. 74-75,
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regard to the sale of anna in Latin America. However, the decision to
sell arms ran into opposition because it conflicted with the Harding
doctrine which was announced in April, 1923. Harding expressly statedt
I hopo it will be the policy of the :.?ar Department to make no
sales of war equipment to any foreign power but that you will
go further and make certain that public sales to our own
citizens will be attended by proper guarantees that such sup-
plies are not to be transferred to any foreign power. 10*
Although this was not an international agreement it definitely appealed
to some segments of American society which favored a return to tho
isolationist policy of tho past. Shis doctrine was never passed by
Congress and it was not presented as an executive order so, of course,
it had no legal force. Thus, although the sale to ubregon represented
a definite departure from the Harding doctrine, Coolidge answered hit
critics by arguing that Harding* s decision was not binding en him as it
did not have the force of law. 10 ** Hughes added tha$ Harding's policy
"in no way precludes us from furnishing arms to aid in the putting down
•f insurrectionary attacks upon the public ordor in a neighboring state
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whoso peaceful development is especially important to us." Never-
theless, the Harding doctrine was extremely embarrassing to tho Admini-
stration when full scale debate opened in Congress in the first few
months of 1924* However, regardless of the popularity of the Harding
doctrine in some quarters, Coolidge and Hughes were correct when they
101New York Times . December 30, 1923, p. 15. Although never on-
acted it is always referred to as the Harding Doctrine by all contempo-
raries*
103
Hue)»«, Hi. Pathway »f P«ao» (K»w Y»rk, 1925), p. 100.
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argued that the dec trine had ne legal force and could not ho considered
ae a restriction or limitation imposed on the freedom of action of the
Administration.
The Administration then presented in clear, concise terms the
reasons for the embargo. As H&ghos explained! "The object (of embargo)
is to aroid tho fomenting of revolution..."104 This frank espousal of
our aim left ne room for doubt as to our true intentions. Oho State
Department was in full agreement with the analysis of tho Mexican
newspaper £1 Universal which stated in an editorial entitled "The
Eternal Tragedy of the Presidential Succession* that "vielonce in any
form causes national retrogression."105 The Administration was well
aware of the unfortunate course vdiich Mexican history had followed from
1911 to ""920 and they seemed prepared to do everything in their power
to prevent any repetition of such events. Coolidgo stated in an ad-
dress to Congress on .February 11, 1924 that "after a long period of
shifting and what appeared to us to bo unsubstantial governments in
that country, we recently reached the opinion that President Obregon
has established a government which is stable and effective and disposed
to observe International obligations. .."106 One cannot read the cor-
respondence of tho participants in tho American decision without being
emphatically aware of tho fact that "stability and orderly procedure"
104Hughos, Our Relations (Princeton, New Jersey, 1928), p. 51.
105Internal Affaira of Mexico . SI 2. 00/26 697, Summerlin to Hughes
£gl Unlvorsal
editorial] . December 21, 1923.
106
United States, Congressional Record , 69th Cong., 1st 3ess.,
1924, LXV, Part 3, 2338.
_
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were uppermost in the minds of American officials. After nearly ten
years of constant disruption with the resultant loss of life and de-
struction of property the State Department now let it be known that
it would not remain inactive when civil strife erupted again.
Hughes, at least, was impressod with ObrogoVs accomplishments in
achieving stability and rebuilding business confidence despite the
fact that he labored under the handicap of non-recognition. 107 In
respect to Obregon*s request for arms which were needed to restore
peace, Uoolidge told the Republican Club ef New York on February 12,
1924
«
To refuse would have appeared to be equivalent to deciding
that a friendly Government, which we had recognized, ought
not to bo permitted to defend itself. Stated in another
way, it would mean that we had decided that it ought to be
overthrown, and that the very agency which we had held out
as able to protect the interests of our citizens within its
borders ought not to bo permitted to have the means to make
such protection effective. 108
Thus, the decision was made to reward Ubrego'n for bringing some sem-
blance of order and peace to Mexico. On the other hand, any faction
which tried to upset constitutional procedure would receive only our
animosity as they threatened to make the situation unstable. Qhis
would result in the loss of life and the loss of business confidence
which the American investor depended on to a large extent. P-»ghes
used a cliche to describe what our main intention in Mexico was.
107
Hughes, 'ihe Pathway of Peace (New fork, 1925), p. 98.
108Allen, op. cit., p. 74.
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He saidt "We are net aiming at control but endeavoring te establish
self-control."109
This was the main argument presented by the Administration in
defense ef the embargo but ether subpeints related to this main
thesis were prosented. The nature of the revolt itself was very
instrumental in determining the eventual American position in re-
gards te the revolt. As Charge7 Summerlin pointed out that the "pre-
text (for the revolt) was the ualles candidature, but revolution
would have come if that pretext had not been provided.
"
110
Even
the flow York -ximes was puzzled as to the real motives of the rebels,
as it commented that "the history of the new movement is curious as
no great national issues are involved..
.
n111 Thus, any hopes that
the Huertistas would bo able to obtain arms in the United states
nearly completely disappeared when it appeared to nearly all the
policy makers concerned in the United States that the revolution-
aries lacked any concrete reasons for their actions. Since many
members ef the military were involved in the revolt, it must have
appeared te the State .Department to be an old-fashioned "cuartelaze"—
a blow struck from the garrison. This latter device held no promise
for peace and stability in the future. Moreever, the split that de-
veloped in the rebel camp made it evident that the "personal element
109ifughe8, The Pathway of Peace (Hew York, 1925), p. 159.
110Internal Afffairs ef Mexioo . 812.00/26868, Sumrnerlin te
Hughes, January 11, 1924.
mffew York Times , December 7, 1923, p. 1.
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in the Revolution was everything. "n2 Thus, if the rebels wsn de-
struction and disorder were likely to continue with its disastrous
effeots on business. <ihe United States Governmont was net likely to
watch the vital raw materials interrupted and Wican businessmen
harrassed due to a series of "family quarrels" within the revolu-
tionary group
Instability brought other problems in its wake as well which
led to our decision. A basic assumption of our State Department had
been that, according to international law, our govornment is respon-
sible for the protection of the property and the lives of its na-
tionals abroad and thus, any throat of injury to our nationals was a
proper matter for our concern. Because of the revolt American lives
were being lost, several Americans were killed whon rebels wreckod a
train near Celaya. 114 In addition, such rebel tactics as forced
leans and destruction of the transportation system of the country
led Hughes to believe that the rebels were attempting to "obstruct
"I "I C
and destroy" American commerce* Such intolerable conditions
could not be allowed to continue if the government was properly to
fulfill its role. Hughes intimated as much when he saidt "tfe thus
have the difficulty that the instability of governments creates a
112S. J. Dillon, "The Inside Pacts of the Mexican Revolution,"
Current History Magazine (New York Times), July, 1924, p. 536.
113Simpson, op. oit
. ,
p. 88.
114Now York Times
,
December, 1923, p. 35.
115Hughes, Our Relations (Princeton, Now Jersey, 1928), p. 52.
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hazard which private capital (and the State Department) refuses te
ignore..."116 Thus, the State Department, if it was te perferm its
mission adequately ef protecting American lives and property, had te
premete stability. In the past, the United States had employed
cruder metheds te insure stability in Hispanic America such as dis-
patching warships te the scene er the landing ef marines. However,
a mere subtle approach was possible here as all that was mainly
needed new was an extensive aid program te Obregon which would insure
his eventual victery. Obregon had proved himself capable of main-
taining order in the past, Thus, an adequate amount of Amorican
ammunition and guns would enable him te stabilize the situation again
without the necessity of the United States getting directly involved
in the c .nation.
Finally, State Department officials suggested the possibility
that if we did not interpose our will serious complications might
develop which might involve us in a more delicate situation later en.
Hughes was not about te abandon the Hoosevelt corollary to the Monroe
Doctrine as he warned that "formal abandonment (of intervention)
might be an invitation to new controversies er might prompt or excuse
117
action which otherwise would net have been contemplated." What new
controversies might arise were net mentioned by Hughes. furthermore
,
it was intimated that if we did net interpose our will a European
116Hughes f The Pathway of Peace (New fork, 1925), p. 136.
117Hughes, Our Relations (Princeton, aew Jersey, 1928), p. 15.
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power might intervene as it was nr duty because ef the Roosevelt
••Wllary to the Monro* Doctrine to maintain ordor in Hiepanie
Anerica, 118 i'oroign governments would have to aot in "behalf of
their citizens in Mexico to protect them if the American Government
failed to take any action, ianis, action en our part had now become
mandatory if order was to he restored. 119
118Perkins, op* clt'» PP» 131-35.
119
^Cftes, Our Relations (Princeton, i\!ew Jersey, 1928), p. 19.
CHAPTER V
IMPLEMENTATION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
la Jala annual report f»r the fiscal year, 1924, Secretary ef
*r Weeks deelaredt «... there were supervised bills presented fer
surplus property sold In the United States te foreign governments,
principally te the Government of Mexico, to the amount ef $965,069.74.
Sales to the Cuban and Mexican Governments amounted to $1,606,145 .92."120
As far as can be determined, the only request of Obregen that was
refused was his need for nayal vessels which has already been men-
tioned. Most of the nearly $1,000,000 in arms which were provided
were bought on credit as the Mexican Government was unable to pay
cash. The first shipment which included 500,000 rounds of ammunition
and 900 rifles was made on jOeoomber 23, 1923. 121 'i&is is the ship-
ment te Mexico which prompted the Congressional inquiry which will
be examined later. As nearly as can be calculated, the total ship-
ment up te March 13, 1924, which for all purposes can be considered
the end of the rebellion, amounted te 20,000 rifles, 5,000,000
rounds ef ammunition, 11 airplanes (mostly of the do Haviland type),
122
33 machine guns, and 2,900 bombs. *kat of the equipment was
•
120United States, Department of War. Annual Report ef the
Secretary of '.var. 1924. n. 169.
121New York Times. December 24. 1923. d. 2.
122New York Times. March 13. 1924. t>. 7.
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distributed to the labor and agrarian batallions which rallied to
the cause of the Federal GoYornmont.
Also, stringent measures were taken to make sure that the
rebels would not receive similar equipment. Justice Department
agents patrolled the Mexican border to prevent any smuggling.
Their funotion was supplemented by the activities of American
workers. On December 21, 1923 Gorapers, President of the American
Federation of Labor, who supported Calles and Obregon, asked the
labor unions in the United States which were engaged in transpert
work "to assist the United States Government in the detection of
gun running and smuggling of illicit supplies to the forces of the
rebellion..."123 Their efforts wore fruitful as they net only dis-
covered contraband headed for the rebels but they also had the effect
of discouraging additional shipments which would result in the con-
fiscation of all the goods. 124 Since most of the northern part of
Mexico was in the hands of the Government, the likeliest place fer
the rebels to receive guns was from New Orleans as they controlled
the Gulf ports in Mexico. Do la Huerta's agents in New Orleans
were kept under close surveillance and arrests were made by the
United States District Attorney in the port. 125 This was a disas-
trous blow for the rebels as their foe was gaining strength with
l23Rowland Hill Harvey, Samuel Gempersi Champion of the
Tollinr Masses (Stanford Univ., Calif., 1935), pp. 190-93.
l24For dotails see Internal Affairs of Mexico * 812»00/26821
,
Surarnerlin to Hughes, January 12, 1924*
125Hew York -rimes , itocember 22, 1923, p» 4»
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eub.tantlal shipments from the United Stat.. Governmont, while they
were being denied the opportunity to gain access to munition* In
the Unltod States, fly the end of January the .ffoct of this had
become evident and tho tide had begun to turn.
Other measures wore also taken in January which substantially
aided Obregen»s cause. In the interests ef protecting American
citizens, we demanded that de la Huerta suspend his order to blockade
Tampioo and Hughes backed up this demand by dispatching the cruiser,
u# s# s » Richmond, to the scene. Heedless to say, the three renel
gunboats which maintained the blockade quickly melted away when the
Richmond, reached the scene. Eae rebels had picked one of tho worse
porta to blockade as this brought about a drop in oil production and
oxpertat* 4. Although the rebels did manage to capture Tampice with-
out the blockade, the failure to cut off supplies did mean a delay in
their plane, especially in relation to control ef the customs houses
in the port. In another similar action, we forced the rebels to re-
move their mines at the ports of Frontera, Puerto Mexico and Veracruz
by issuing a "solemn warning" to tho rebels. 127 irh«y tried to bar-
gain with Hughes by requesting that the Bravo . a Federal gunboat, bo
Interned in Wew Orleans by American authorities.^-2® ihe requost was
126 Internal Affairs of Mexico . 812.00/26763, Hughes to Consul
Wood, January 19, 1924.
127Ibid » . 812.00/26788, Hughes to American Enbassy in Mexico
City, January 21, 1924.
12 ffIbid . . 812.00/26799, Consul Wood to Hughes, January 19, 1924
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denied and the Bray* did finally gall for Mexioe on February 9,
1924. 129 Typical of the double gtandard employed by Hughes threugh-
eut the struggle was his reaction to the news that the Federal
eorernment had rained the port of Salina Cruz. Although Hughes
warned Obregon of "the grave effeots en American sympathies" if an
American vessel was hit by a mine, he did not demand that they be
removed as long as they were within the three-mile limit. 130 Thus,
while Obregon could run supplies into a beleaguered garrison, the
rebels, if they wore surrounded, would be taking a calculated risk
in reinforcing their troops if their only approach was by sea.
Finally, the United States also aided Obregon by allowing 2,000
Mexioan troops to pass through nineteen miles ef eur territory in
131
the El Pase area, to facilitate a government offensive. Although
there were precedents for such action, it was definitely generous ef
us to grant such permission which resulted in a Federal victery.
Cur aid was of such importance that it played a substantial
part in altering the outcome of the struggle. Our assistance, as
described above, was either indirect or resulted from protests en
the part ef eur government. However, a major question remains un-
answered. i)id the United States directly intervene in the struggle
by deploying special troops to Mexico? As was already mentioned,
129 Ibid . . 812.00/27012, Summerlin to Hughes, February 9, 1924.
13
°Ibld . . 812.00/26803, Hughes to American Embassy in Moxiee
City, oanuary 23, 1924.
13lForeign Rolations, 1924 (Jfoshington, 19391, II, 431.
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Clin, charged that seventeen United States planes bombed the de la
Huerta revolutionaries in Jalisco. A clarlficatien 1. needed b.fere
examining the validity of the charge. i<he United States Government
did supply eleven planes but Cline inferred that uoelidge alse sup-
plied the pilots. It is the latter charge which must be examined.
It should be made clear that American pilots were operating in
Mexico on both sides. j)e la Huerta agents did attempt to enlist
five American aviators in New Orleans and they apparently were sue*
cessful. 132 They appeared to be suocesful because, despite the fact
that the Mexican Army Air Corps remained loyal to Ubregen, renel
aircraft were active in the early part ©f the campaign and it may be
assumed that aliens were manning the craft. Rebel aircraft broke
the Federal blockade at Manzanilla by forcing the gunboat Progresso
to surrender on January 5, 1924. 133 Definite evidence exists that
at least two American pilots, Charles Mayse and H. L. Andrews, were
members of the Mexican Army as they were discharged from the army by
Obregen on May 13, 1924. 134 The aircraft of the federal Government
also played a decisive role in the rebellion, especially at the
135
battle of Jimenez. 2h» main point is that these pilots were not
l32Internal Affairs of Mexico T 812.133/9400, Burns to Hanna,
January 5, 1924.
133 Ibid .
. 812.00/26919, Consul Aguirre to the Secretary of
State, January 2, 1924.
134 Ibid .
. 812.00/2714, Consul AicEnelly to tho Secretary of
State, ilarch 13, 1924.
l35 Ibid . . 812.00/26970, Consul MoEnelly to the Secretary of
State, January 31, 1924.
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members ef the United States Army Air Corps as inferred by Cline.
This can be substantiated by the fact that the Secretary ef \&r re-
perted te the President that frem June 30, 1923 te June 30 f 1924
Inclusive, only one American enlisted man died in Alexice and he was
absent without leave from his post in the United States. 136 In
addition, there is no record of any United 3tates troops in Mexico
in this period. 137 American pilots who were in Mexico then,
were net members of our armed forces but simply can be classed as
adventurers. For any ef a number ef reasons they slipped across the
border and applied for service with either the Government ef the
rebels. Thus, pilots of our government did not fly these planes at
Jalisco and there is no concrete evidence that there were more than
two and net seventeen American adventurers in the Mexican army*
Another question immediately arises. Did American officials
cooperate as Cline believes, by allowing these "soldiers of fortune*1
te slip across the border? It is possible, of course, that this was
the beginning of a modern day practice, whereby a "volunteer 11 army
was sent to a troubled area under the official auspices ef the
government. This charge lacks validity if one examines ttiffhes f s
reaction to the news that Americans were involved in the fiehting»
Hughes informed Summerlint "The Department fears that the activities
ef these Americans (Mayse and Andrews) may result in the occurence
l36United States, Department of Tfer, Annual Benort of the
Secretary of Vfetr . 1924, p. 136.
Ibid .
.
p. 130.
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ef seme rtertttaoU incidents involving serious oinse^no.s and be-
lieves that appropriate authorities (Obregon) should take strp. to
terminate their services with the Mexican Army,"138 An incident,
which could occur if an American piloted plane killed Mexican women
and children in an air attack, would mean increased anti-American
fooling. Mere importantly. Hushes accurately predicted that the
rebels would take advantage of this in their propaganda when the
news became known, (ike great fear, of course, was that this in-
formation (American pilots killing Mexicans) would lead to reprisals
against innocent American citizens who were conducting legitimate
business transactions in Mexioo, especially in Parral and Jimenez.139
Due to the fact that Mayse was also supplying planes to Obregon,
United S .tes officials considered this to bo a violation of the
embargo, as State Department approval had not boon given, and Attor-
ney General Daugherty promised to prosecute Mayse when he was appre-
hended. 140 finally, in the last weok of February, Sumraerlin Informed
the Mexican Foreign Office that the United States wanted the two
Americans officially dischargod from service in the Mexican Array.141
They were net dischargod until May 13, 1924 because the Mexican
Government was reluctant to dismiss them as they were valuable not
l38 Internal Affairs of Mexico . 812.00/26970, Hughes to Sumraerlin,
February 12, 1924.
l39 Ibld .. 812.00/26970, Consul McEnelly to the Secretary of
State, January 31, 1924.
140 Ibid . . 812.00/27040, J>aughterty to Hughes, February 23, 1924
141Ibid . . 812.00/27055, Sumraerlin to Hughes, February 21, 1924.
58
•illy ag pilots but also because of tht planes that they supplied.
However, this cannot be considered as cooperation on the part of the
United States government. Hughes was entirely consistent here as he
was mainly interested in protecting American citizens in Mexico and
the activities of these two Americans could only have endangered all
ether Americans in the country by creating seme regrettable incident.
Lastly, one must consider why Oline made this statement. Gline
did net try to distort the picture, even though his Inferonce was in-
correct. His basic mistake was caused by accepting an unreliable
source as concrete evidence, namely, the propaganda issued by the
rebels as the rebellion was coming to an end. As possible victory
turned to defeat, tke rebels wore willing to grasp any straw or to
take advantage of any issuo to change what had beoemo inevitable by
the end of #tobruary. In the rebel newspaper Rovoluoioq a charge was
made by General Salvador Abrarade, after his defeat at Guadalajara
which statedt H . ..he (Obregon) has employed foreigners to pilot his
aeroplanes to assassinate Mexioans upon their own soil."142 Cline*s
statement follev/ed this charge as Guadalajara is tho capital of the
state of Jalisco. It was propaganda as can be seen by the inclusion
of the word "assassinate." Do la Huorta continued in the same vein
as he saidt
It matters net that Obregon hires North American pilots to
man the air ships and to carry murder and death to old people.
14 2Ibid . . 812.00/27104, Consul Aguirre to the Secretary of
State, February 15, 1924.
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wLTnTT ?«f;n»«l«« <^Hdr.a . a. it happ.ned lnS JhJ5 ^^hborinC ltat, of ilichoaoan); tho horrible
£«! ! ° ° f Patrl «««"» la tho heart, of eur
SmJS I* * UntlUh^ ^terminate the breed oftraltorg in our country, 143
Again it was an attempt to capitals on the latest anti-American
feeling in the country and to embarrass Obregon. By pointing to the
United States as the true enemy, do la Huerta tried to discredit
Obregon by charging that he had sold out his country to its powerful
northern neighbor. This is the only evidence that can be uncovered
which substantiates Clint's inference of direct intervention by the
American government. Of course, his reference to the fact that arms
were supplied to Obregon was entirely correct. However, at best,
propaganda such as this is useful to the historian only as an in-
dication of the plight that the rebels were in. Propaganda, with its
distorted message, cannot be considered as concrete evidence to sup-
port such a supposition.
Thr jeginning of the end occurred at the battle of Esperanza
en January 29, 1924 when Sanchez 1 , forces were routed, leaving behind
2500 dead and 1500 prisoners. 144 V/ith one of the chief instigators
of the revel t removed from the scene it was only a matter of timo.
A few days later, do la Huerta was forced to evacuate his headquarters
at Veracruz. 14 ^ This was the beginning of a long trok for him as he
143 Ibid.. 812.00/27042, Costolle to Coolidge, February 27, 1924.
144New York Times . February 7, 1924, p. 16.
14 5 Internal Affairs of Mexico . 812.00/26940, Consul Sood to
Hughes, February 5, 1924.
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moved from port to port. The campaign in tho west was Just as de-
oisiTO as General JSstrada saw his army crushed at Ootelan. 146
Finally, en the 20th of iAarch do la Huerta departed for the United
States on tho gunboat Zara^oza to begin nearly twenty years in exile
as a piano teacher in California.
In summary, the reasons for the success of Obrogon are quite
OTidont. One factor was American aid which enabled Obrogon to un-
leash an offensive after being on the defensive for the first month
of tho war. Oho rebels were threatening to isolate completely Mexico
City until tho United States decided to supply Obregon's labor and
agrarian batallions with the necessary firepower needed to overcome
tho defections in the army. From that point on Federal troops not
only blunted the rebel offensive but slowly and inexorably took over
the initiative, ©ras, American aid was one of the decisive factors
147
which enabled Obregon to repulse de la Huerta' s forces. Other
factors also were involved in tho defeat of tho rebels but these were
not as important as American aid which brought tho dramatic change
which occurred in January. For instance, the "cult of personalism"
which had been one of the major causes of the revolt was also a factor
which was responsible for its outcome. At the first sign of impending
defeat, the heterogeneous group of rebels broke into complete dis-
array. Constant quarrels which erupted among tho gonerals prevented
14 6 Ibld . . 812.00/26983, Suramerlin to ttughes, February 11, 1924.
147Gruoning, oj>. cit . , p. 600.
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any cohosiYe plan from being formulated. Finally, a great deal ef
credit must be giren te Obrcge'n who not only strengthened the morale
•f his troops despite rererses but he also preyed to he an excellent
military strate ffist, especially at the beginning ef the rebellion as
he concentrated his troops around the capital until the ware ef de-
fections in the army ran its course.
*
CHAPTER VI
DOMESTIC REACTION TO THE AMERICAN DEC 13 ION"
It Is time to examine the reactions of various segments »f
American society to the State Department decision to aid Obrego'n.
This is necessary in a democratic environment as foreign policy 1*
most instances is influenced by the Initial response of various
interest croups. In the case of the decision to aid Obregon, the
reaction of different croups in our society, especially Congress,
was instrumental in forcing the Administration to explain its
reasons for intervening indirectly In the dispute* Except for the
"brief and terse announcement of January 7, 1924 by Coolidge, there
seemed to be no disposition en the part of th© State Department to
discuss the matter further. However, when the debate in Congress
began Hughes and Coolidge were forced to elaborate and issued a
series of major policy statements. Thus, the Administration was
compelled to fully explain its decision. There is ne evidence that
any -form of American aid was delayed (except possibly for the bombs)
or cancelled because of the domestic reaction but there is no doubt
that the Administration was concerned enough to schedule a series of
speeches by the highest government officials. Lastly, it must be
seen if the public was porcoptive enough to see what was happening,
namely, the supplying of weapons to the established government in
order to try and maintain the status quo in the world by crushing
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any threat to the established order.
First of all, the reaction of the press, which helps to for-
mulate American opinion, must he sorutinized if one is able to un-
derstand the initial responses to Coolidge's decision of January 7,
1924. During the election campaign which preceded the revolt,
American editorial opinion, as sampled by the Literary Mmmmt,
sympathy divided between de la Haerta and Callos. 148 However, after
the revolt began ajid Obrege'n forced Calles into the background, most
American newspapers deplored the use of violence and stressed the
importance of orderly succession, tfer example, the Spring-field,
Republican commented that the revolution in Mexico "is a depressing
reminder that the development of self-disciplined, orderly and
henest democracy is a painfully slow process."149 Continuing in the
same vein the New York Eveniner Pest saidi "Wh»n a ifo*-4M« •«m*«rf»«T
for the Presidency throws his sombrero into the ring, a machine gun
goes wit it."150 'ihe American press was unanimous (no dissenting
voice could be found) in condemning what the Literary Digest tenrad
the "Unpepular Evolution. "151 As a result when Coolidgo announced
his decision to support the Mexican Government most newspapers and
Journalists applauded the decision to sell arms to restore order*
148
"Causes Behind the Mexican Revolt," Literary Digest,
December 22, 1923, p. 11*
149Springfield Republican, December a, 1923, p. 3»
150
"Causes Behind the Mexican Revolt," Literary Digest,
December 22, 1923, p* 11*
151«*iiaxico*s Unuouular Revolution." Literary Direst. January 5.
1924, p. 17,
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In an article f.r the Kew York Times, Prank Behn concluded that a
"new reTolutienary government would brinC counter-revolution so
there would be a ciril war for a lonC time" and thus, we would only
hare to Intervene later.152 £ditoriallyf ^ uew York Tim, fl r#_
fluoted the Administration's yiewpeint reading the necessity of
the sale. It said* "ffe must prevent revolutions, or nip them In
the hud, so as to save ourselves the awkwardness of having to deal
with one officially, If it became successful."153 One newspaper
favored even a stronger policy, namely, direct intervention as the
Chlea
^c Tribune suggested that American troops bo sent to Mexico to
"plattify" the country. 154
There were some critics of our policy who objected ts the arms
sales mainly on the basis that it might have the epposite effect
from that which was desired. As the New York Times pointed out
"oven if the interests are wise," there are 'numerous risks."155
In a letter to the editor, Jehn Kelly statedt "The cne thing that
the Mexican people will not tolerate is foreign interference in their
152"cFrank Bohn, "President Coolldge and the Mexican Crisis,"
New York Times. Decoraber 20, 1923, p. 14. See also George Creel,
"And So We Meddle in Mexico." Colliers , February 2, 1924, p. 5.
15sNew York Times . January 2, 1924, p. 16.
154Uni ted States, IMpartment of State, Records of the Depart 1
ment of State Relating to Political Relations Between the United
States andJJexlco 1910-19^9 Ofeshington, I960), 711.12, Summerlin
to Hughes [iinclosuro !To. Ij f January 2, 1924
155
New York Times, December 31, 1923, p» 12*
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domestic problems. In upholding Cbrego'n they have ruined him.* 156
Evidently this unknown writer remembered: the events of 1914 and 1916
whon the entrance of American troops onto Mexican soil outraged the
Sloans and they were almost unanimous in their disapproval of our
action*
It must be seen if the newspapers were aware of the change
which took place in our Latin American policy. It is of importance
to note if American newspapers considered the State Department's new
policy to be a dangerous precedent which would involve us in future
difficulties. First of all, there can be ne doubt that most American
newspapers realized a shift had occurred in our policy, .ttyen a
strong supporter of the administrations decision to sell, George
Creel (a propagandist for Obregon), admitted the action was noyel
except for a sale by Lincoln some sixty years before. However, he
dismissed such criticism with the observation that the "United
States will always meddle because it can't help it."157 Sot all
contemporaries were able to dismiss Ooelidge's decision so easily.
Even near the end of the revolt, the Hew York Times stated that
Coolidge's "action may cause a troublesome precedent, but it's for
158democratic, orderly government. " However, despite the fear of
trouble because of this new policy, most American newspapers, while
applauding the decision to keep ubregon in power, offered no con-
ii ii i i . I i —i i i
156•'"'
"New York Times
.
January 1, 1924, p. 22.
157George creel, "And So We Meddle in Mexico." Colliers .
February 2, 1924, p. 5.
159Now York Times . February 14, 1924, p. 16.
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•tntttlTt alt.mative t. the Administration' 8 decision f sell arms^
exporting th. goal of stabilization, no oth.r acceptable pro-
posal was .ffered ti reach the ^&lf ^ ^ Now Yefk^
what tho future might hold whon it commented, "Still doopor will bt
th. confusion if wo undertake to docido not only what is law in this
homisphoro but what is order. Our now policy doesn't l.oturo on good
government but docidos which is pure government and will cans, now
anim.sitios against us.»l6° ^if this warning which was largely
ignored as no major segment of society took up the hue and cry, the
Hew York Times itself was mainly responsible for its ineffeotualnos.
as most of its editorials dwelt on th. success of American policy and
not with the real meaning or long range effects of tho now policy.
Even though tho New York Times, warning failed to arouse criticism,
at least the attempt was made to explain the effects of our policy.
Other interest groups wore vitally coneorned about the course
of American policy vis-a-vis Mexico as well. One of tho most
Tociferous supporters of tho administration was Samuel Gompers of
th. American federation of Labor. First of all, on December 11
Gompers praised the Mexican Federation of Labor for supporting
President Obrogon. 161 He then directed a concerted campaign to
convince Secretary of Stato Hughes to put a stop to the sale of
159
"Causes Behind the Mexican Revolt. » Literary Dip-eat .
Decembor 22, 1923, pp. 10-11.
16 0
New York Times . January 2, 1924, p. 16.
161
»Sllliam JSnglish filing, Ike Mexican Question (New York,
1927), p. 90.
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BWaitLM t. d. la Huerta. 162 Of course, when the Administration
decision of January seventh wag announced Gcmpers wag jubilant.
Hig roagong fer supporting ubregoli are not so obvious as ubregon
and titxlean labor were not on the friendliest of terms for a number
163of reasons. However, after the initial struggle in the C. H. 0. M.
between the do la Huerta faction and Obregon»s sympathizers, the
C. H. 0. II. decided to support Obregon and tempers accepted thetr
decision,
-inhere is evidence provided by Gempers himself that he be-
lieved do la Huerta had numerous personality defects which he had
discovered in his meetings with him and thus, he must have welcomed
the C. R. 0. M. decision. 164 Adding further impetus to Gomper's de-
cigion to gupport Ubrego'n and the Ooolidge Administration, was hia
evident belief that the delicate negotiations between American and
Mexioan labor leaders which had resulted in the establishment of the
"Labor Monroe uectrine" in the autumn of 1923, which was beneficial
to the /• ^rican federation of Labor, would be rescinded if do la
Huerta was successful. 165 If Gempers needed any further evidence to
cenvlnoe him that he chose the right course of action, it was not
long in coming as Huerta issued an anti-labor decree en December 24
162Harvey, op. £it.
, p. 327.
163For additional information see Clark, op_. olt . , pp. 99-105.
164Sarauel Gorapers, Seventy Years of Life and Labor (New York,
1925), II, PP. 319-20.
165Harvey, _op. olt . , pp. 326-27.
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In Merida which established harsh penalties fer labor unions. 166
Thus, the enly major interest group in the United States which
persistently and actively took a position in regard to the revolt
in Mexico was a strong supporter of the administration's decision
to sell arras to Obregon while denying the same to the rebel s.
Other interest croups, although less persistent than the
American federation of Labor also expressed their opinions about the
sale of American equipment to the Mexican Government, 'ike most
serious opposition to the sale outside of Congress arose when the
General staff expressed its disapproval of the sale, 167 Evidently
the army was fearful that these weapons might be used against our •
troops if we were forced to intervene direetly in the struggle as
was the case in 1914 and 1916. ihis source ef opposition grow more
•erious when the generals convinced Secretary of Har Weeks that
their position in regard to the sale wag correct. 'iJhis development
threatened to split the administration and produce a bitter struggle
which would delay the sale of the military equipment. However,
after conferring with Hughes, Weeks was convinced that the sale was
necesaary and ne longer did he persist in defending the army'g
168
position. The generals' epposition continued even though their
civilian superior changed his mind.
166Hew York Times. January 14. 1924. d. 5.
167irew York Times. December 30. 1923. r>. 15.
170Uew York Times. January 1. 1924. p. 2.
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criticism was eff„ t by an old arch enemy .f most Mexican
presidents, namely, the border states. <*» border states .f the
United states were mainly interested in stability in Mexico as ohaee
and cenfusien eften meant possible raids from south of the border to
antagonize the United States as happened in 1916 and 1918. Thus,
the border states favored the Mexican arms sales as they saw the
choice as either support of Obregon or anarchy. 169 Steps were taken
by such mon as Governor Hunt of Arizona to aid the administration by
intercepting any aid or assistance which was rendered to the Mexican
170
rebels. Finally, other interest groups in Arizona, such as
American business, although not expressing approval or disapproval of
the sale, let their sympathies be known by their constant reference
to the need for stability, 'ihe silence of other groups during the
debate ever the arms sale can bo interpreted as a sign of approval
for the administration's action.
The most sorious opposition to the sale originated in congress.
Recognizing the fact that the President had the power to declare ex-
ceptions to the embargo under the provisions of the 1922 act, Con-
gress could not challenge the constitutionality of his action.
However, despite the precedents and the use of the 1912 reselution
in the past, congressmen maintained that Coolidge had reversed the
policy of his predecessor, V/arren G. Harding. The critics of the
sale decided that the best course of action was to try and enact the
169
Kew York Times . January 13, 1924, Sec VII, p. 13.
170812» 00/26694, eg. clt . . Hughos to Sunraerlin, December 21,1923.
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"Harding Doctrine" Ut. law. As a result Mr. B.binsen introduced
Dill 1819 In the Senate
.n January 8, 1924, a bill which would hay*
prevented "the 8ale of arms or munitions to foreign governments and
to foreign military or political authorities by tho United Statu
and any eitisen or corporation thereof."171 Action was delayed until
this time (nine days after the sale) because Confess had Just re-
convened. At the same time Representatire Fairchild introduced a
resolution in the House "directing the Secretary of State to inform
the House, if not incompatible with the public interest, certain in-
formation regarding the sale to Mexico of certain war materials."178
Of course, the inquiry never even started as Hughes felt it was net
in the national interest to divulge information which might arouse
anti-American feeling in Mexico, The Senate bill which was the best
hope of the critics of the administration received support from
various quarters as Representatives Gardner of Texas and Cellar of
New York and Senators Johnson of California and Jonos of New Mexico
favored enactment of the Harding doctrine, iheir basic argument as
expressed by Cellar ran thuslyi
In conclusion, if the Obregen Government is strong it would
have prevailed despite our aid? if it is weak, our aid will
add little to its resources and could net turn defeat into
victory, life have surely embarked on a course which we shall
ha-we continual and increasing occasion to rogret. \7e can
171A ' AUnitod States, Congressional Record
, 69th Ceng., 1st Sess.
,
1924, LXV, Part 1, 686.
172
Ibid., p. 770.
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net set ourselves up as a holy alliance bent upon preserving
the status que In the Western Hemisphere. 173
Hiram Johnson continued in the same rein as he accused Hughes ef
trying to establish himself as the "new iletternioh.
"
174 Howerer,
despite the efforts of the Congressman, their battle was futile from
tho beginning as the proposed legislation quickly became bottled up
in committee, ilie cumbersome and tortuous path that a bill must
take through uongross insured inaction on this matter, hven if it
became law oxer the President's veto, the sale would haTe been com-
pleted and most senators evidently did not see any possible future
use for such a provision.
Also, there was evident in the debate in Congress the propensity
ef seme Americans to take advantage ef our power, they suggested that
the government receiving our aid should be so grateful as te accept
conditions established by the United states or to agree to conces-
sions wher' future disagreements arose. Although Hughes did net im-
pose any conditions on ubregon in return for our help, seme congress-
men did not want conditions imposed and it indicated a possible
future trend which our policy would take. Most ef these requests
were mild in relation to the position of Senator Shortridge ef
California, He suggested that in return for our help, Mexico should
change her Constitution "so to make possible the sale of Lower
l73united States, Congressional apdord . 68th Congress, 1st
3ess., 1924, LXV, Part 2, p. 1408.
174
"A Sleight of Hand Deal in Mexico," Current Opinion .
February, 1924, p. 146.
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California and tht root of tho land in Mexico around tho Colorado
River to tho Unitod Statw...""5 ait TOa , fMffl #f lefiftl Mack_
mail which oould only engender incroagod anti-American feeling in
tho republicg to the south of ug./lt ig to Hugheg'g orodit that ho
did not ontortain any guch theughtg and that ho did not require any
conditions. However, this does not moan that tho United Stateg did
not take advantage of tho faet that Obregen wag in a gerietig predica-
ment. An argument dere loped when Hughe g maintained that American*
who had paid taxeg to tho rebels whe controlled the Gulf ports did
not hare to make a second payment to tho Mexican Government when
Federal troops regained the ports. 176 However, Obregon considered
payment of taxes to the rebels as "null and void and that such taxes
must be repaid to the Government. 177 Thau, a real conflict had
arisen. 33m merits of each side in tho ease were not at issue hero
as American handling: of tho dispute was of paramount importance.
Hughes instructed Summerlln "to point out the extent of tho material
and moral assistance which this Government has rendered to tho
Mexican Government during the last few months. At the same time you
should make it clear in ne uncertain termg that the Government mugt
insist that guch restraint shall not be exercised upon legitimate
American commerce."17® Hughec wag not reluctant to ugo our aid ag
175New York (Dimes . January 13. 1924, Sec. VII, p. 13.
17 6Forei,ra Relations. 1924 (Washington, 1939), II, p. 440.
177Ibla
. ,
p. 444.
"<W.
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an opening wodfo in hi. dispute with Mexican authorities to eain the
initial adrantace. lima, despite his pronouncements in defense of
the emharee, he showed that it could he used as a weapon to insure
conformity with our demands, lhe Mexican corernment hacked down as
it did not require that the taxes he paid ac&in.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
After a stalemate of a little ever two years, the United States
finally recognized the Obregen government en August 31, 1923 after
the Bucarell conference concluded. Keoognitlon occurred at the time
because Hughes and Coolidge believed that the outstanding questions
of the past had been settled satisfactorily. At the conference the
United States had gained what appeared to bo substantial guarantees
In respect to alaims, oil lands and agrarian reform.
Shortly after Obregen was recegnizod, he was faced by a serious
internal crisis which was caused by the upcoming presidential elec-
tion. The crisis led to the outbreak of the do la ttuerta revolution.
The initial reaction of the United States government towards the
revolt was not to interfere in the struggle because Hughes believed
that the revolt would bo localized and that Obregen would be able to
crush the insurrection easily. However by the fchird week of December
it became quite evident to Hughes from the reports of our consuls
that either Obregen would be defoated or, at best, it would be a long
drawn out struggle, ilie prevailing disorder had an adverse effeot en
American businessmen in Mexico and delayed enactment of the conces-
sions given by the Mexican commissioners at the Bueareli conference*
For these and ether reasons, Hughes developed his policy of "non-
belligerent interposition" which emphasized that the United States
74
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would aid Obregen U encourage constitutional procedure,
.rdtr and
.tability. ft, result was that Coolidge declared an embargo en arms
and munitions going t. Mexico except fer these shipments which were
sent te the Obregen government. United States aid was sufficient
enough that government forces were able to take the initiative for
the first time in January. However, American aid did not include
direct interference in the struggle by the American government as
the Department of State took steps to try and eliminate the use of
American adventurers by the Mexican government. Although these
efforts were unsuccessful, the American government did not sanction
the use of American pilots by Obregon as Cline inferred.
First of all, 1 would like to state that I wholly agree with
our decision to fully support Obregon. If the rebels succeeded, it
would have been either a return te the days of Dias, whieh was nearly
impossible after the Constitution, or a prolonged struggle similar te
that of " 14. Halle the decision itself was praiseworthy, the
reasons behind it were dangerous. «lth Hughes emphasis was placed on
stability and order and he ignored the domestic achievements of
Obregen. 179 'j&us, the important thing, henceforth, for any Latin
American government was to provide guarantees te American investors
that they would not be molested in their business transactions.
Alv/ays Hughes returned to his main theme that the government had te
insure stability if business was te prosper. I/O would judge a
179Hughes, ihe Pathway of Peace (Hew York, 1925), pp. 98-101
and Hughes, uqr Relations (Princeton, Aew Jersey, 1928), pp. 51-53
and 81-84.
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coremment primarily (and It sometime.
...med .ol.ly)
.n ltl ablllty
to kttp order roadless of what the COTornmont did d.me.tioally.
In addition, Huffhos made, it quite el.ar that we opposed any threat
ti the established order. ACain Huehoe did net fully explain that
constituted a justified revolt. Without this distinotion our polioy
could easily change to one of complete opposition to all rebellions.
The arm. embargo was an effectiye method of enforcing our desire to
maintain the status quo. We wore denyinff these countries the rifiht
to follow our example of 1775 which condoned roTolutien. were
moTini: from the position that rerelutien was justified at times to
break the shaekles of tyranny, to a completely new position of een-
demainc ae»rty all revolutions which was completely alio* to our
earlier b< itaee. *ihe attempt to maintain our position is the world
was also connected with the ability of our businessmen to Cot from
ether nations the rital raw materials which we lacked. An attempt
was being; made to maintain the status quo in a world whioh was con-
stantly in moToment. IVe were adopting an inflexible policy based
mainly en one factor, stability, while the winds of chance eircum-
Tented the clebe. In many oases in the future, our arms policy
would be usod to frustrate the aspirations of the masses in a country
In the interests of stability and we would suffer the censequenoes*
V/ithout any doubt, stability is important but wo beoarae blinded by
the magnitude of its importance and failed to take into consideration
ether rital factors such as the wishes of the people. Intervention
in the interests of democracy usually can be Justified but interyen-
77
tit* In tat interests
.f maintaining the status que tan rarely b.
Justified,
Hughes, of course, was net the originator ef this policy. Oar
first preoccupation with the word, stability, was in evidence after
the Spanish-American %r when we first gained recognition as a world
power, 'ike Piatt Amendment gave ns the right to intervene in Cuba
whenever it was necessary to preserve political stability. The do-
Telepment of this idea continued when Roosevelt distorted the Monroe
Doctrine. Net only could we intervene in any Latin American country
when it was threatened by an external danger, but we ceuld also exer-
cise our "international police power'* in times of an intornal crisis.
For any number of reasons we could use th© doctrine of interposition.
Instability was condemned again by our pronounced intention to pre-
vent "chronic wrong-doing" or the "loosening ef the ties of civilized
society." Again chronic instability should be condemned but our
vague statements ceuld be used as a pretext to Justify any inter-
ference which threatened to upset the status quo. This emphasis en
stability continued under Taft with his policy of "dollar diplomacy."
Investments could only bo made in a society where law and order ex*
is ted. A break occurred to some extent in the new course which
American policy makers were pursuing when Y/llaon became President*
He changed the major emphasis ef eur poliey frera stability to the
idea that the consent ef the populace was the major factor te be con-
sidered in his famous Mobile address* As a matter ef fact, he en-
couraffcd instability and disorder to eliminate a dictator. Huerta f
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from the seen.. Of course, Wilson did not always riffidly follow
this policy as ho did intervene, for instance, in Nicaragua to
promote stability. But, at least, he reduced our total emphasis en
stability by injecting a second factor into the picture namely, a
• onsideration of the aspirations and desires of the peoplo. In my
mind, ifuChes»s greatest blunder was not only that he reverted to the
Roosevelt era but that he reeraphasizod the fact that stability should
be almost the sole determinant in deciding what our course of action
should be. A consideration of the people's desires was again relo-
cated to a position of minor importance. Our policy can only im-
prove if we consider a number of factors before deciding our course
of action. Just as rovelations stem from multiple causes, our
policy should bo designed to cope with every eventuality with special
emphasis plaeed on the wishes of the peoplo.
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